Unmasking the Fallacies in the populist rights Abortion Argument

1. Introduction:

This analysis engages with the pro-life arguments articulated by the populist right in the United States. Their position is grounded in a Christian understanding of the sanctity of life, which posits as an absolute and inviolable principle. The populist position contends that abortion constitutes the unjustified termination of a human life, morally tantamount to murder. This stance hinges on the assertion that life begins at conception, thereby endowing the unborn with an inherent right to life irrespective of the circumstances of conception.

This position further asserts that abortion is never medically necessary, advocating for emergency Caesarean sections in instances where the mother's health is jeopardised. His position extends to cases of rape and incest, where he maintains that the termination of a pregnancy remains morally unjustifiable. This rigid stance, devoid of contextual considerations, underscores the simplistic nature of his argument, which relies solely on the premise of the sanctity of life derived from a Christian worldview.

This text undertakes a critical examination of the American populist right wing  pro-life position from three distinct perspectives:

A Critical Analysis of the Sanctity of Life: This section challenges the universality and consistency of the "sanctity of life" principle. It questions the selective application of this principle, which appears to prioritise the unborn while neglecting the plight of those facing systemic barriers to basic necessities and social justice.

Abortion and Freedom of Opportunity: This section explores the tension between the rights staunch opposition to abortion and the frequent championing of "freedom of opportunity." It argues that restricting access to safe and legal abortion impinges on women's autonomy and their ability to exercise control over their reproductive lives, thereby contradicting the notion of individual freedom that the right purports to advocate.

Human Life or Human Consciousness: This section challenges the equation of biological life with personhood, arguing that the development of human consciousness is a complex process that extends beyond mere biological existence. It raises questions about the moral status of the unborn and the extent to which their rights should supersede those of the pregnant woman.

To provide a factual grounding for this analysis, it is necessary to acknowledge the historical and philosophical roots of the "sanctity of life" concept. This principle is primarily derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition, wherein humans are believed to be created in the image of God, thereby possessing inherent value and worth. This belief is further reinforced by scriptural prohibitions against killing, underscoring the importance of preserving human life.

2. The sanctity of life:

While the sanctity of life is a core tenet of Judeo-Christian tradition, the selective application of this principle raises concerns. The right champions the inherent value of human life within the womb, yet seemingly disregards the plight of those facing systemic barriers to basic necessities like healthcare, housing, and food security. The United States, despite its professed reverence for life, grapples with an estimated 45,000 annual deaths due to lack of health insurance, exceeding mortality rates from kidney disease and homicide. This inconsistency exposes a potential dissonance between pro-life rhetoric and a commitment to safeguarding the well-being of those already born. It suggests that the sanctity of life, as they define it, may be contingent upon a capitalist framework that prioritises individual responsibility over collective well-being.

Highlighting the inconsistencies within this position, advocates passionately defend the unborn, yet are less vocal about systemic issues that threaten the lives of those already born. This inconsistency suggests a real disconnect between the rhetoric of valuing life and the actions taken to support the value in the real world. By focusing almost exclusively on the unborn, this argument implicitly prioritises potential life over actual lives facing increasing hardship under the American system. This raises some serious concerns about which lives the populist right views as truly valuable and worth protecting within this framework. 

In this analysis, a conscious decision was made to refrain from directly engaging with the theological underpinnings of the "sanctity of life" argument. The objective was to demonstrate that even if one accepts the validity of this principle, the actions of those who profess to uphold it often betray a selective and inconsistent application. This approach seeks to highlight a potential dissonance between espoused values and actual practices, prompting a critical examination of the ways in which this principle is operationalised within specific socio-political contexts. By focusing on observable behaviours and outcomes rather than engaging in theological debates, this analysis aims to maintain a focus on the pragmatic implications of the "sanctity of life" argument, particularly as it pertains to issues of reproductive autonomy and social justice.

With this position, the right unknowingly then reduces life to simply the act of being. The populist right being strong supporters of capitalism, the quality of life is not a matter of concern. In such a capitalist system, individual responsibility is emphasised over collective well-being. This leads to situations where access to essential resources like healthcare is tied to economic status, potentially resulting in preventable deaths. This seems at odds with a universal belief in the sanctity of life as this capitalist framework does not view life as inherently sacred.

It is noteworthy that even nations with complex historical and ideological frameworks have recognised access to abortion as a fundamental right for women. Consider Iran, for example. Despite its authoritarian political system and theocratic legal framework, abortion was legalized in 1977 as part of a broader modernization effort aimed at promoting gender equality. While the legal landscape surrounding abortion in Iran has experienced periods of both restriction and liberalisation, access has been consistently available since 2005. This demonstrates that even within a society where religious interpretations heavily influence legal and social norms, abortion is acknowledged as a necessary option for women. This observation is not intended as a defense of the Iranian regime, but rather as an illustration of the recognition of abortion rights within a country with a far stricter socio-political structure than the United States.

Furthermore, it may be surprising to learn that the former USSR was the first nation globally to legalise abortion in 1920. This decision was motivated by a broader commitment to advancing women's rights and equality within a socialist framework. While the legality and accessibility of abortion fluctuated throughout the Soviet era, it remained largely accessible from 1955 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These examples from Iran and the USSR underscore a critical point: even within strictly controlled regimes with vastly different ideologies, the necessity of providing women with access to safe and legal abortion was acknowledged. This observation challenges the notion that opposition to abortion is inherently linked to concerns about the sanctity of life. Rather, it suggests that within a capitalist framework, such arguments may be strategically employed as a means of controlling female reproductive autonomy and maintaining existing power structures.

The cited stance on the moral status of the foetus, often characterised by his adherence to the "sanctity of potential life," necessitates a critical examination of the philosophical concept of potentiality. While proponents of the right asserts that a foetus, due to its potential for personhood, should be afforded the same sanctity as a fully realized person, this assertion remains largely unexamined within the broader discourse surrounding potentiality.

The concept of potentiality, denoting the inherent capacity for change or becoming within something, often underpins arguments for the moral status of the foetus. This approach, however, rests on the problematic assumption that potentiality is a real property of a thing, rather than a linguistic construct describing possible future states. This analysis of the position argues that potentiality, in the Kantian sense, is not a predicate that can be meaningfully applied to an entity to determine its moral status. Instead, focusing on potentiality as a basis for moral rights or duties neglects the nominalist perspective and leads to ethically untenable conclusions.

From an Aristotelian perspective, potentiality is indeed considered a real property, inherent to an object and existing even before actualization. This view, when applied to the foetus, suggests that its potential to become a person imbues it with a right to life. However, this raises a critical question: does the mere possibility of a future state justify granting an entity full moral consideration in its present state?

To address this, we turn to Immanuel Kant, whose deontological ethics provides a framework for evaluating moral status. Kant's moral philosophy centres on the concept of personhood, characterised by rationality and autonomy. He argues that moral worth is grounded in the capacity for rational self-determination, the ability to act according to self-imposed laws. Crucially, for Kant, this capacity is actual, not potential. It is the exercise of reason, not the mere possibility of it, that grants moral status.

In Kantian terms, potentiality is not a predicate that can be attributed to an object to determine its moral worth. A predicate, for Kant, expresses a real property of a thing, something that can be empirically observed or rationally deduced. Potentiality, however, is not an actual property; it is a conceptual tool we use to discuss possible futures. We can observe actual events and infer potential outcomes, but the potential itself remains an abstraction, not a property inherent to the object.

To illustrate this, consider a skin cell. While it possesses the genetic information necessary to become a cloned human, we do not grant it the moral status of a person. Similarly, an individual may have the potential to become a renowned neurosurgeon, but this unrealised potential does not obligate them to pursue that path. Conversely, someone might possess the potential to become a serial killer, yet we do not pre-emptively imprison them based on this possibility.

These examples demonstrate the absurdity of grounding moral duties or rights in potentiality. Such an approach would lead to a slippery slope where any entity with any potential for future development would demand moral consideration. It ignores the crucial distinction between what is and what might be.

Furthermore, emphasising potentiality can overshadow the autonomy and rights of actual persons. In the context of the abortion debate, focusing solely on the potential personhood of the fetus disregards the bodily autonomy and self-determination of the pregnant individual. A Kantian framework, with its emphasis on respecting the autonomy of rational beings, would prioritise the rights of the pregnant person over the unrealised potential of the foetus.

3. Abortion and freedom of opportunity:

The American right frequently extols the virtues of "freedom of opportunity," often in the context of critiquing perceived left-wing tendencies towards equality of outcome. However, their staunch opposition to abortion appears to contradict this principle. By restricting access to safe and legal abortion, women are denied the opportunity to exercise bodily autonomy and make decisions about their reproductive health. This enforced outcome stands in stark contrast to the notion of individual freedom that right wing pundits purports to champion. Moreover, framing abortion as an "easy way out" disregards the complex circumstances that may lead individuals to seek this procedure. It is crucial to recognise that abortion can be a critical tool for protecting the health and well-being of women, particularly in cases where pregnancy poses significant risks or results from traumatic experiences like rape or incest.

Returning to the theme of control, it is essential to recognise that the option to terminate a pregnancy represents precisely that – an opportunity. It is not a default response to challenges in pregnancy, nor an "easy way out," but rather a safeguard for situations where the foetus or mother's health is critically endangered or the circumstances of conception are profoundly detrimental to the well-being of all involved. Such pregnancies, irrespective of their ultimate outcome, are inherently fraught with complex ethical and safety concerns.

The recurring motif of control appears central to the critiques levied by those on the right and others who share his perspective. This desire for control, often masked by appeals to Judeo-Christian ethics and the inherent value of life, raises a critical question: what motivates this need to exert control over reproductive decisions? This inquiry necessitates an examination of the fundamental distinctions between men and women, acknowledging that while the ongoing discourse surrounding gender and identity is relevant, this analysis will employ the terms male, female, man, and woman synonymously for clarity.

Societally and biologically, men and women share a vast spectrum of capabilities. Few roles remain exclusive to either sex, and while variations in ability may exist, the similarities between the sexes far outweigh the differences. However, one critical distinction persists: the female capacity for gestation and childbirth. While fertilisation requires both sexes, the mother alone bears the responsibility for the developing foetus, a profound and unique capacity that arguably grants women a distinct advantage.

It is this very advantage, I contend, that the American populist right and those who share this ideology perceive as a threat to their own sense of masculine authority. In a socio-political landscape where men have historically held positions of power, the ability of women to independently sustain and bring forth new life challenges traditional power dynamics. Pregnancy, then, becomes a focal point for anxieties surrounding control, prompting efforts to restrict reproductive autonomy and reinforce patriarchal structures. This perspective suggests that anti-abortion rhetoric may be driven, at least in part, by a desire to reassert male dominance in the face of female reproductive power.

4. Human Life or Human Consciousness: 

Many anti-abortion arguments rests on the assumption that biological life, from the moment of conception, constitutes personhood. However, this definition fails to consider the complex interplay of biological, psychological, and social factors that contribute to the development of human consciousness. While the potential for life exists at conception, the emergence of a fully formed individual with unique thoughts, feelings, and experiences is a gradual process that unfolds over time. This raises questions about the moral status of the unborn and the extent to which their rights should supersede those of the pregnant woman.

Many arguments for the commencement of life at conception lack sufficient biological justification and conflate the distinct concepts of human life and personhood. While  accurately defining human life as beginning at fertilisation, their argument falters due to the absence of a clear demarcation for the onset of personhood. This conflation implicitly suggests that fertilisation marks the beginning of personhood, a position that necessitates further examination.

From a biological perspective, human life, in this context, refers to the existence of an organism belonging to the species Homo sapiens. This life undeniably begins at conception, with the union of sperm and egg initiating the developmental trajectory encompassing embryos, foetuses, infants, and beyond. This basic developmental journey, while varying in degree and nature across individuals and stages, remains a fundamental characteristic of human life.

However, personhood, a concept laden with philosophical and ethical implications, transcends mere biological existence. It denotes the possession of specific characteristics or capacities that bestow moral status and rights upon an individual. While a universally accepted definition remains elusive, commonly cited criteria include consciousness, self-awareness, rationality, the capacity for communication, and the ability to form relationships. These criteria, inherently subjective and influenced by societal norms, shape our understanding of personhood and its associated rights.

The historical treatment of enslaved Africans in the United States serves as a poignant example of the consequences of denying personhood. Despite their undeniable biological existence as members of the human species, enslaved individuals were legally regarded as property, devoid of basic human rights and subjected to brutalization. This denial of personhood, predicated on racial prejudice and socio-economic motivations, tragically illustrates the profound implications of decoupling personhood from human life.

It is crucial to acknowledge that enslaved individuals inherently possessed personhood and the associated attributes, rendering the institution of slavery morally indefensible. However, this logic, based on the inherent personhood of enslaved individuals, cannot be directly applied to foetuses.

A key distinction lies in the developmental stage and the consequent absence of the qualities typically associated with personhood in foetuses. While enslaved individuals exhibited consciousness, self-awareness, and the capacity for relationships, foetuses, do not possess these characteristics.

In this context, the pregnant woman, as a fully developed person with the capacity for conscious decision-making and self-determination, holds a higher moral status. Her autonomy and well-being take precedence, particularly when considering the potential physical and emotional burdens of pregnancy and childbirth.

Therefore, while the denial of personhood to enslaved individuals constituted a grave moral violation, the same logic does not extend to foetuses. The pregnant woman's personhood and her right to bodily autonomy remain paramount in ethical considerations surrounding abortion.

Therefore, the distinction between human life and personhood carries significant ethical and legal weight. While human life undeniably commences at conception, the attribution of personhood, with its attendant moral and legal considerations, remains a complex and contested issue. A nuanced understanding of these distinct concepts is crucial for informed discussions on issues such as abortion, an understanding in which Kirk does not demonstrate.

Hegel's theory of self-consciousness provides a robust framework for critiquing the notion that personhood commences at conception. Within Hegelian philosophy, self-consciousness is not an inherent attribute possessed from the outset of biological development. Rather, it emerges through a dynamic and reciprocal interaction between the individual and the external world, particularly through engagement with other self-conscious beings.

Crucially, Hegelian self-consciousness is not solipsistic; it necessitates the recognition of the self in another and the reciprocal recognition of the other. This intersubjective recognition is foundational to the development of self-consciousness and, consequently, personhood.

Applying this framework to the question of foetal personhood, it becomes evident that a foetus lacks the neurological and cognitive capacity for the social interactions that are a prerequisite for Hegelian self-consciousness. The foetus, unable to engage in reciprocal recognition with others, cannot achieve the self-awareness that characterises personhood in the Hegelian sense. Therefore, to ascribe personhood to a foetus based solely on its biological potential is philosophically unsound.

This perspective challenges the assumption that personhood is an intrinsic property conferred at conception. Instead, it posits personhood as an achieved state, contingent upon the development of self-consciousness through social interaction and mutual recognition. This nuanced understanding has significant ethical implications for debates surrounding abortion and foetal rights, emphasizing the importance of considering the developmental stage and relational context of the foetus in ethical deliberations.

5. Final remarks:

In conclusion, the populist rights pro-life stance, while rooted in the Judeo-Christian principle of the sanctity of life, demonstrates inconsistencies and contradictions when examined within a broader socio-political context. His selective application of this principle, prioritising the potential life of the unborn while neglecting the systemic injustices that threaten the lives of those already born, reveals a potential dissonance between his professed values and the actual implications of his ideology.

Furthermore, his opposition to abortion contradicts his advocacy for "freedom of opportunity," as it denies women the autonomy to make decisions about their reproductive health and futures. The conflation of biological life with personhood, as evidenced in his stance on abortion, disregards the complex process of developing human consciousness and the ethical considerations that arise from it.

Ultimately, a nuanced understanding of personhood, grounded in philosophical principles and developmental considerations, is essential for navigating the complexities of the abortion debate. Prioritising the autonomy and well-being of individuals capable of rational self-determination, while respecting the sanctity of life, offers a more ethically sound and compassionate approach to this contentious issue.